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I tend to agree with Professor Borsboom that psychology, and more generally the social
sciences, could beneﬁt from better psychometric modeling. However, if psychometric develop-
ments are to have more effect on everyday practice in psychology, psychometricians probably
need to pay more attention to the substantive and methodological problems in various areas of
psychology. For example, Professor Borsboom is critical of the Standards for educational and
psychological testing (AERA, APA, NCME, 1999) for suggesting that group differences in test-
criterionrelationshipsarerelevant totestbias.Hebaseshiscriticismontheﬁndingthatpredictive
invariance is not the same as measurement invariance. However, he fails to acknowledge the so-
cial,political,andethicalproblemsassociatedwithfailuresofpredictiveinvarianceinhigh-stakes
contexts (e.g., employment and admissions testing). The Standards are designed to provide test
publishers and test users with guidance on a range of practical measurement problems. In this
context, predictive invariance is a major issue in itself. If we want psychologists to pay more
attention to psychometric analyses, these analyses need to recognize the psychologists’ problems
and goals.
Before getting into a discussion of Professor Borsboom’s analyses, it is probably useful
to consider his desired state of affairs. He mentions several options for the interpretation of
attributes, but seems to prefer what he calls a “reﬂective latent variable modeling scheme,” in
which a latent attribute is assumed to cause the test behavior, and the psychometric model reﬂects
this causal relationship. In an earlier paper, Professor Borsboom and his colleagues argued that a
test is valid as a measure of an attribute:
ifandonlyif(a)theattributeexistsand(b)variationsintheattributecausallyproduce
variations in the outcomes of the measurement procedure. (Borsboom, Mellenbergh,
& Van Heerden, 2004, p. 1061.)
Under the reﬂective model, the latent attribute is the variable of interest, and the test is developed
to reﬂect the attribute. I am comfortable with this kind of interpretation. It is certainly a common
modelfortheinterpretationofmeasurementsinthesocialsciences.However,asillustratedbelow,
it is not the only viable kind of score interpretation, and it is not the best interpretation in many
cases.
Operational Deﬁnitions, Classical Test Theory, and Construct Validity
ProfessorBorsboomconsidersthreetheoreticalobstaclestotheintegrationofpsychometrics
and psychology: operational deﬁnitions, classical test theory, and construct validity. My remarks
will focus on these three basic concerns.
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Operational deﬁnitions were introduced into physics in reaction to the overthrow of tra-
ditional, common-sense assumptions about space and time by Einstein’s theory of relativity.
Bridgeman (1927) and the logical positivists sought to eliminate this kind of upheaval by
eliminating implicit assumptions in science. They did not so much equate theoretical constructs
with observable attributes, as strive to eliminate theoretical assumptions from their descriptions
of observations. They tried to be absolutely clear about what they were doing (generally a good
habit), but they also tended to downplay or eliminate theory altogether (not generally a good
strategy).
Following this lead, some psychologists decided to deﬁne some theoretical attributes (e.g.,
intelligence) in terms of speciﬁc measures. Ironically, this simple replacement of theoretical
attributes by observable attributes, called “operationism,” had effects diametrically opposed to
Bridgeman’s goal (Ennis, 1973). Instead of eliminating unwarranted theoretical assumptions,
“operationism” assigned all of the assumptions associated with a theoretical construct to the
scores on a particular test, thus importing unwarranted assumptions by the carload. To deﬁne a
theoretical term like intelligence narrowly in terms of a speciﬁc measure, while interpreting it
broadly in terms of the traditional notion of intelligence, is clearly unwarranted.
However the operational speciﬁcation of measurement procedures is certainly legitimate,
if not essential. The operations used to collect data and to generate scores should be clearly
described. Measurement procedures should be operationally deﬁned, but theoretical attributes
cannot be operationally deﬁned.
Professor Borsboom sees the “true scores” of classical test theory as reinforcing operationist
tendencies in psychology. The true score, which is deﬁned as the expected score over replications
ofthemeasurementprocedure,isclearlydependentontheoperationaldeﬁnitionofthisprocedure.
However, true scores are used mainly as a basis for analyzing the precision, or reliability, of
measurements, and in classical test theory, reliability is paired with validity, which examines the
relationship between the true scores and the variable of ultimate interest. By focusing on the
distinction between the true score and the variable of interest, validity theory tends to run counter
to operationism.
Thetheoryofvalidityhasalongandcheckeredhistory,butbythe1980s,ageneralconception
of construct validity provided a uniﬁed framework for validity (Messick, 1989). In the original
formulation of construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955), substantive theory was assumed to
provide a “nomological” network of relationships among theoretical constructs and observable
attributes, and the meanings of the constructs were determined by their roles in this network. The
validity of a measure of a theoretical construct would be evaluated in terms of how well its scores
satisﬁed the relationships in the network.
Initially, the nomological networks were conceived of as formal theories (e.g., Newton’s
laws), but because such theories are rare to nonexistent in psychology, the requirement was
relaxed to include open-ended collections of relationships involving the construct of interest.
There was a shift from what Cronbach (1989) called the “strong form” of construct validity to
what he called the “weak form” of construct validity.
Under the weak form of construct validity, the tight networks envisioned by Cronbach and
Meehl(1955)werereplacedbycollectionsofrelationshipsinvolvingtheconstruct.Forconstructs
of any generality, such collections could be both vast and ill-deﬁned, making it very difﬁcult to
evaluate the measure’s ﬁt to the network. Professor Borsboom’s conclusion that construct validity
functions as “a black hole from which nothing can escape” overstates the case, but by rolling all
of the issues inherent in justifying a proposed interpretation into one big ball, many discussions
of construct validity have tended to discourage would-be validators.
Nevertheless, the basic question addressed by validity theory, how to justify claims based
on test scores, is of fundamental importance. I have suggested that validation can be simpliﬁed
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scoresbespelledoutandevaluated(Kane,inpress).Thisapproachallowsforavarietyofpossible
interpretations and uses for test scores, with the caveat that any proposed interpretation or use
be justiﬁed by appropriate evidence. So, operationally deﬁned variables are ﬁne as long as we
recognize them for what they are, and do not slide any theoretical claims in under the radar. A
claim that the score resulting from a measure can be interpreted as an estimate of a latent attribute
that causes the observed performances is also acceptable as long as the claim can be justiﬁed. A
theory-based interpretation is admissible as long as the theory is speciﬁed and the measure’s ﬁt
to the theory is established.
Professor Borsboom argues that construct validity “must be fundamentally ill-conceived
for the simple reason that no physicists are currently involved in the ‘neverending process’ of
ﬁguring out whether meter sticks really measure length” (Borsboom, 2006, p. 431). Of course,
it is also hard to ﬁnd physiometric models (corresponding to our psychometric models) that
specify a causal relationship between the latent attribute of length and the observed extension of
objects in space. Length once provided a classic example of an operationally deﬁned attribute
(remember the platinum–iridium bar in a temperature-controlled chamber in Paris—the standard
meter).Now,itcanbeconsidered atheoretical attributewithinthespecialtheoryofrelativity.The
operational deﬁnition was adequate at one time and is still adequate in many contexts. The newer,
theory-based deﬁnition is used when it is needed. Having methodologists tell scientists what they
can and cannot do would limit progress, if the scientists paid any attention to this advice; luckily,
they generally don’t pay much attention.
The Role of Theory in the Development and Validation of Measures
Professor Borsboom suggests that a psychologist who proposes a measure for a theoretical
attribute should spell out the relationship between the attribute and the proposed measure and
that this would lead the researcher, “to start the whole process of research by constructing a
psychometric model” (Borsboom, 2006, p. 429). This is all well and good, but how does the
researcher go about deﬁning the attribute, the measure, and the relationship between the two?
Presumably,theprocessisnotarbitrary.Wewouldgenerallynotproposeameasureofintelligence
that was based on speed in running the mile, just as we would not propose a measure of physical
ﬁtness based on completing verbal analogies. However, on a ﬁner level, what tasks should be
included in a measure of intelligence (or ﬁtness) and what should be left out? And, how do we
evaluate how well the measure is working?
One important determiner of how this process is likely to work is the state of theory
development in the area under investigation, with little or no substantive theory at one end of the
continuum and a formal theory that can guide test development at the other end.
Development and Validation of Measures without Theory
Assuming that no formal theory exists (the usual case), the test-development process is
necessarily ad hoc, guided by general conceptions of the attribute of interest. For example,
intelligence is assumed to promote success on a wide range of cognitive tasks, and measures of
intelligence generally consist of samples of such tasks. The model is causal but not detailed or
formal.
In the absence of a formal theory that speciﬁes a particular form for the psychometric
model, the researcher who follows Professor Borsboom’s advice is likely to adopt some standard
unidimensional IRT model. We have a test consisting of a set of tasks that are thought to reﬂect
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of the model parameters requires large sample sizes, which are not available in many areas of
psychology, but if the model can be applied, it yields estimates of a latent ability for each person
and of one or more parameters for each task.
The resulting latent ability scale derives most, if not all, of its substantive meaning from the
sample of tasks on which it is deﬁned. A formal IRT model can be applied to different kinds of
tasks to deﬁne different scales; like all formal systems, it does not, in itself, contribute substantive
content. The population on which the scaling is conducted can also inﬂuence the proposed
interpretation, but in most applications of IRT, it is assumed that the scale is invariant across
persons and groups. So, the scale derived from a standard IRT analysis is largely determined by
the observations used to estimate the model parameters. The latent scale is operationally deﬁned
in terms of the domain of tasks on which it is based (not that there is anything wrong with that).
The fact that the responses have been scaled using a psychometric model does not turn the scale
into a theoretical construct. Bridgeman’s (1927) conception of operational deﬁnitions allowed
for the use of sophisticated mathematical models (Benjamin, 1955).
The choice of which of the currently available IRT models to use is often dictated by the
preferences of the modeler; some like fewer parameters and some like more parameters. The
choice may also be inﬂuenced by ﬁt statistics, with preference going to the model that provides
the best ﬁt to the data. In the absence of strong substantive theory, this is a reasonable basis for
evaluating models, but it also reﬂects the dependence of the scale on the observations generated
bythemeasurementprocedureandnotonanaprioriconceptualizationofthetheoreticalattribute.
In the absence of theory, we do not know how the latent attribute has its effect (although we
may have some hypotheses), and we do not know how this attribute is related to other variables
(although we may have some hypotheses). In order to develop our understanding of these issues,
we will need to do some empirical research and some theorizing. To draw conclusions about the
attribute (e.g., that test results can be generalized to new contexts) simply because we scaled the
responses and assigned a trait label to the scale (e.g., “intelligence”) would be unwarranted.
Assuming that we want to use our scale scores to make some predictions about future
performance on nontest tasks in nontest contexts, it would be prudent to examine how well these
predictions turn out. Assuming that we want to make causal claims about how the attribute affects
performance on the tasks included in the measure or on other tasks, we would need to develop
support for these inferences, and the support for such causal inferences generally involves both
empirical research and theory development. The procedures used to develop support for such
inferences have been discussed under the heading of construct validity (Messick, 1989).
It is tempting to interpret the latent ability estimates generated by the IRT model as a real,
causal attribute, and if no claim is to be made beyond this immediate causal claim (i.e., that some
otherwise unspeciﬁed latent attribute causes the observed performances), the causal attribution
does not make much difference. However, if the hypothesized causal claim is used to justify other
inferences (e.g., predictions about future performance on other tasks or in other contexts), then
these additional claims need to be examined.
Development and Validation of Measures Based on Theory
Ifsolidtheoryexists,itcanbeusedtoguidetestdevelopment inawaythatbuildssupportfor
a reﬂective interpretation in terms of a causal, latent attribute. In particular, if the theory provides
a causal explanation of the relationship between the latent attribute and performance on some set
of tasks, performance on the tasks can be used to draw conclusions about the causal attribute.
This approach works well in areas with highly developed quantitative theories, but it cannot be
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is possible only after the theory is in place; it is not the ﬁrst step, but one of the last steps in a
research program.
Analternativeapproachthathasbeenappliedtoseveralkindsoftestperformanceistotakea
well-established measure of some attribute (e.g., intelligence) and develop causal models for the
performances included in the measure (Embretson, 1998). This research tradition takes perfor-
mance on the measure as an observable variable of interest and seeks to explain the performance
in terms of latent abilities and task characteristics. The dependent variables in these analyses, per-
formances on speciﬁc tasks, are operationally deﬁned. The independent variables used to specify
task characteristics are also operationally deﬁned. Latent ability, which is determined by overall
performance on the test as a whole, is also initially operationally deﬁned, but can be interpreted
as a latent, causal attribute after the causal model of performance has been developed.
The Role of Psychometricians
Attheend ofhispaper, ProfessorBorsboom suggeststhat psychometricians readwidely and
that they get involved in the development of substantive theory. This is a great suggestion. It can
foster the development of both substantive areas and psychometric theory. I think that it would
be especially useful for psychometricians to join research groups as full participants who are
actively engaged in all aspects of research projects. I am not talking about a consulting gig or an
elegant reanalysis of some existing data set (not that there is anything wrong with either of these
activities), but rather about participating in the preliminary analysis, hypothesis development,
study design, and data collection, as well as the analysis and interpretation of the results.
Psychologists are likely to make use of psychometric models if they perceive these models
to be helpful to them in achieving their goals. Getting them to make greater use of psychometric
models is partly a function of making the models accessible (through education, better textbooks,
computer programs), as Professor Borsboom suggests, but it is also a function of getting their
attention, and a great way to get their attention is to show them what you can do for them.
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